Marshall, Tara v. Mueller Company by Tennessee Court of Workers Compensation Claims
University of Tennessee, Knoxville
Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative
Exchange
Tennessee Court of Workers' Compensation Claims
and Workers' Compensation Appeals Board Law
3-9-2016
Marshall, Tara v. Mueller Company
Tennessee Court of Workers Compensation Claims
Follow this and additional works at: http://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_workerscomp
This Compensation Hearing by the Department of Labor and Workforce Development, Court of Workers' Compensation Claims is a
public document made available by the College of Law Library and the Department of Labor and Workforce Development, Court of
Workers' Compensation claims. For more information about this public document, please contact wc.courtclerk@tn.gov.
IN THE COURT OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION CLAIMS 
AT CHATTANOOGA 
Tara Marshall, 
Employee, 
v. 
Mueller Company, 
Employer, 
And 
Ace American Insurance Company, 
Carrier. 
Docket No.: 2015-01-0147 
State File No.: 63950 2014 
Judge Audrey A. Headrick 
COMPENSATION HEARING ORDER 
This matter came before the undersigned Workers' Compensation Judge on February 
16, 2016, for a Compensation Hearing, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-
239 (20 15). The sole legal issue is whether Ms. Marshall is entitled to increased permanent 
partial disability benefits beyond her original award. 1 For the reasons set forth below, this 
Court finds Ms. Marshall did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that she is 
entitled to increased permanent partial disability benefits. 
History of Claim 
Ms. Marshall is a fifty-three-year-old resident of Hamilton County, Tennessee. (T.R. 
1.) Mueller Company employed Ms. Marshall in the Cluster Department. !d. Ms. Marshall 
sustained a work-related left-leg fracture on August 14, 2014. (Ex. 4.) Mueller did not 
contest compensability, and the parties settled Ms. Marshall's claim on July 31,2015, prior to 
the expiration of the initial compensation period. (Ex. 1.) After the initial compensation 
period expired on October 13, 2015, Ms. Marshall filed a Petition for Benefit Determination 
seeking increased permanent partial disability benefits. !d. 
On August 14,2014, when Ms. Marshall sustained a work-related left-leg fracture, her 
hourly wage was $19.56 plus overtime. (Ex. 4.) This hourly rate included Ms. Marshall's 
1 A complete listing of the technical record, stipulations, and exhibits admitted at the Compensation Hearing is attached 
to this Order as an appendix. 
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base pay of $17.86, an extra $1.50 for Mueller's summer hours' bonus, and a $0.20 shift 
differential increase. !d. The summer hours' bonus refers to a program memorialized in a 
collective bargaining agreement, titled "Memorandum of Agreement," entered into on May 7, 
20 13. (Ex. 3.) The agreement states, in pertinent part, the following: 
!d. 
The Company and the Union (USW) have mutually agreed that the current 
business environment is in a recession and for the Company to take full 
advantage of the lowest energy rates offered by [TV A] we are adopting, on a 
non-precedent setting basis, irregular shift hours. Beginning on Sunday June 
2d, 2013 at 8:00 PM and ending October 4, 2013 for the Iron Melt, Foam 
Molding, Cleaning Room, General Foundry Labor and No-Bake Iron 
Departments. 
Employees working in the effected [sic] departments will receive a $1.00 per 
hour shift premium on top of their contractual shift premium during the 
irregular shift schedule. 
The parties stipulated the Memorandum of Agreement is still in effect. The parties 
also stipulated the Memorandum of Agreement affected all employees working in the Melt 
Department, including Ms. Marshall.2 Several departments at Mueller fall within the Melt 
Department; however, Mueller cannot state the terms of the Memorandum of Agreement 
affect at least fifty percent of all hourly employees at Mueller.3 The Wage Statement 
prepared by Mueller included the summer hours' bonus wages made by Ms. Marshall in the 
fifty-two weeks preceding her injury on August 14, 2014. (Ex. 4.) Ms. Marshall's average 
weekly wage is $1,122.50, which equates to a weekly compensation rate of$748.33. !d. 
After her injury and subsequent surgery, Ms. Marshall returned to work at Mueller on 
February 3, 2015. !d. At the end of the initial compensation period on October 13, 2015, 
Ms. Marshall's hourly rate was $18.16. !d. The 2015 summer bonus hours' program ended 
on September 30, 2015, and "all employees in the Melt department returned to their normal 
base rate of pay." !d. 
2 The "Cluster Department" identified by Ms. Mueller in her PBD is not included in the list of departments referenced in 
the Memorandum Agreement. However, it was undisputed that Ms. Marshall's department falls within the terms of the 
Memorandum Agreement. 
3 Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(3)(D)(iii) (2015), an employee is not entitled to increased 
benefits when: "The employee remains employed but received a reduction in salary, wages or reduction in hours that 
affected at least fifty percent (50%) of all hourly employees operating at or out ofthe same location." 
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Ms. Marshall filed a Petition for Benefit Determination on November 10, 2015, 
seeking increased permanent disability benefits. The parties did not resolve the disputed 
issues through mediation, and the Mediating Specialist filed a Dispute Certification Notice 
on December 14, 2015. This Court conducted the Compensation Hearing on February 16, 
2016. 
At the Compensation Hearing, Ms. Marshall argued Tennessee Code Annotated 
section 50-6-207(3)(B) (2015) controls the outcome in her case and provides certainty that 
she is entitled to increased benefits. She pointed out the following pertinent language in 
Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(3 )(B) (20 15): 
If at the time the period of compensation provided by subdivision (3)(A) ends, 
the employee has not returned to work with any employer or has returned to 
work and is receiving wages or a salary that is less than one hundred ( 1 00%) of 
the wages or salary the employee received from his pre-injury employer on the 
date of injury, the injured employee may file a claim for increased benefits. If 
appropriate, the injured employee's award as determined under subdivision 
(3)(A) shall be increased[.] 
Ms. Marshall argued the legislature changed the pre-Reform law regarding permanent partial 
disability benefits and included specified multipliers to provide certainty in the outcome. She 
contends the plain meaning of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(3)(B) (2015) 
entitles her to increased benefits. 
Mueller countered the legislature did not intend for the facts ofMs. Marshall's case to 
trigger increased benefits, but it intended for the Court to look at all of the circumstances 
involved when making rulings under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(3)(B) 
(20 15). Mueller pointed out that Ms. Marshall remains in her same job, makes her regular 
pay, and will return to summer hours' bonus pay this June. Further, it contends Tennessee 
Code Annotated section 50-6-207(3)(D)(iii) (2015) does not automatically entitle an 
employee to increased benefits if less than fifty percent of all employees are affected by 
reductions in salary, wages or hours.4 
In the event the Court awards increased benefits, the parties stipulated that Ms. 
Marshall's calculation of increased benefits in the amount of $14,634.28 is correct, with 
Mueller receiving a credit in the amount of$23,572.40 for the original award. (Ex. 4.) 
4 Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(3)(D)(iii) (2015) prohibits an employee from recovering increased 
benefits when fifty percent or more of all employees operating at or out of the same location are affected by reductions in 
salary, wages or hours. However, that provision appears to apply only to situations where the decrease in salary, wages 
or hours occurs after an employee's work-related injury: "The employee remains employed but received a reduction in 
salary, wages, or hours[.)" Tenn. Code Ann.§ 50-6-204(3)(D)(iii) (2015) (emphasis added). 
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Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
The Workers' Compensation Law shall not be remedially or liberally construed in 
favor of either party but shall be construed fairly, impartially, and in accordance with basic 
principles of statutory construction favoring neither the employee nor employer. Tenn. Code 
Ann.§ 50-6-116 (2015). The employee in a workers' compensation claim has the burden of 
proof on all essential elements of the claim. Scott v. Integrity Staffing Solutions, No. 2015-
01-0055,2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 24, at *6 (Tenn. Workers' Comp. App. Bd. 
Aug. 18, 20 15). "[A ]t a compensation hearing where the injured employee has arrived at a 
trial on the merits, the employee must establish by a preponderance ofthe evidence that he or 
she is, in fact, entitled to the requested benefits." Willis v. All Staff, No. 2014-05-0005,2015 
TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 42, at *18 (Tenn. Workers' Comp. App. Bd. Nov. 9, 2015). 
See also Tenn. Code Ann.§ 50-6-239(c)(6) (2015) ("[T]he employee shall bear the burden 
of proving each and every element of the claim by a preponderance of the evidence."). 
As previously stated, the sole legal issue is whether Ms. Marshall is entitled to 
increased permanent partial disability benefits beyond her original award pursuant to 
Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(3)(B) (2015). In Hadzic v. Averitt Express, 
No. 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 14, at *8-9 (Tenn. Workers' Comp. App. Bd. 
May 18, 2015), the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board addressed the principles of 
statutory construction: 
Courts must avoid a construction that unduly restricts or expands the meaning 
of the language used, as every word is presumed to have meaning and purpose. 
I d. As stated by one court, when the words used "clearly mean one thing, the 
courts cannot give them another meaning under the guise of construing them." 
Pfizer, Inc. v. Johnson, No. M2004-00041-COA-R3-CV, 2006 Tenn. App. 
LEXIS 44, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2006). 
Additionally, [t]he court must examine the language of the statute and, if the language is 
unambiguous, apply the ordinary and plain meaning. I d. If the language of the statute is 
ambiguous, the court must examine the entire statutory scheme and the legislative history to 
ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent." Galloway v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 137 
S.W.3d 568, 570 (Tenn. 2004) 
The first sentence of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207 (3 )(B) (20 15) states: 
If at the time the period of compensation provided by subdivision (3)(A) ends, 
the employee has not returned to work with any employer or has returned to 
work and is receiving wages or a salary that is less than one hundred (I 00%) 
of the wages or salary the employee received from his pre-injury employer on 
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the date of injury, the injured employee may file a claim for increased benefits. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Since "every word is presumed to have meaning and purpose," the Court must analyze 
the legislature's use of the word "wages." Hadzic, supra. "Wages" is not a defined term in 
the Workers' Compensation Law. In pre-Reform cases, the Tennessee Supreme Court 
defined "wage" in relation to its interpretation of the temporary partial disability statute and 
the right of reconsideration statute.5 In Wilkins v. Kellogg Co., 48 S.W. 3d 148, 153-154 
(Tenn. 2001 ), the full Supreme Court concluded "wage" means an employee's hourly pay as 
opposed to an employee s "average weekly wage ' when calculating temporary partial 
disability benefits pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(2).6 The Court 
noted it had previously reached the same conclusion regarding the former use of the word 
"wage" in the statute for permanent partial disability benefits. ld. at 152. Likewise, in 
Powell v. Blalock Plumbing & Elec. & HVAC, 78 S.W.3d 893, 897 (Tenn. 2002), a right of 
reconsideration case, the Supreme Court reiterated that, "the wage of an employee who is 
compensated on an hourly basis is the employee's hourly rate of pay." 
In Wilkins, the employee was seeking temporary partial disability benefits because of 
reduced overtime hours after she returned to work on light duty restrictions. Wilkins, 48 
S.W.3d at 150. The Court noted the employee's hourly pay was $21.52 per hour, and she 
received an increased hourly rate for her overtime hours. !d. A union contract was in place 
that prohibited employees from working overtime while on restricted duty. ld. The Court 
acknowledged the employee "took home less pay while on temporary partial disability status, 
but this is only because she worked 40 hours per week rather than her usual 60 hours per 
week-a limitation imposed on light duty workers by the governing union contract." Jd. 
Under those facts, the Court analyzed the employee's "wage" as follows: 
[Ms. Wilkins] only received an hourly wage from Kellogg, and this hourly 
wage remained the same before and after her injury. It is true that she typically 
worked twenty hours overtime per week and that after her injury she was 
unable to work these extra hours. Yet this decrease in hours was mandated by 
a union contract, which placed limits on work hours for light duty employees. 
5 The Tennessee Workers' Compensation Appeals Board allows reliance on precedent from the Tennessee Supreme 
Court "unless it is evident that the Supreme Court's decision or rationale relied on a remedial interpretation of pre-July 1, 
2014 statutes, that it relied on specific statutory language no longer contained in the Workers' Compensation Law, and/or 
that it relied on an analysis that has since been addressed by the general assembly through statutory amendments." 
McCordv. Advantage Human Resourcing, No. 2014-06-0063,2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 6, at *13 n.4 
(Tenn. Workers' Comp. App. Bd. Mar. 27, 2015). 
6 The Court's holding in Wilkins regarding the computation for temporary partial disability benefits was overruled on July 
1, 2004, when the temporary partial disability statute was amended to include the phrase "average weekly wage." 
Williams v. Saturn, No. M2004-01215-WC-R3-CV, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS I 032, at *8 (Tenn. Workers' Comp. Panel Nov. 
15, 2015). 
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Despite her inability to work overtime, she still worked a full forty-hour week 
and was compensated based on a full forty-hour week. . .. As we have stated 
previously, the purpose of workers' compensation is to "provide injured 
workers with periodic payments as a substitute for lost wages in a manner 
consistent with the worker's regular wage." Wilkins did not need a "substitute 
for lost wages in a manner consistent with [her] regular wage" because she 
was in fact paid her regular wage for the forty-three days she was on temporary 
partial disability status. 
!d. at 153. 
There are also many pre-Refonn cases involving collective bargaining agreements 
wherein the employees received a lower hourly rate of pay during plant shutdowns. See 
Young v. Bridgestone Ams. Tire Operations, LLC, No. M2011-02551-WC-R3-WC, 2013 
Tenn. LEXIS 10, at* 10-* 12 (Tenn. Workers' Comp. Panel Jan. 10, 2013) (holding the lower 
cap applied because the employee had a meaningful return to work because the collective 
bargaining agreement reduced his hourly wage by $2.72 per hour due to economic 
conditions); Robinson v. Bridgestone Ams. Tire Operations, LLC, No. M2011-02238-WC-
R3-WC, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 840, at *2-*12 (Tenn. Workers' Comp. Panel Nov. 21, 2012) 
(holding the employee was not entitled to reconsideration benefits when a collective 
bargaining agreement entered into after the employee's case settled resulted in an hourly 
wage reduction to all union members due to economic reasons); Edwards v. Saturn Corp., 
No. M2007-01955-WC-R3-WC, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 617, at *7, *10-*30 (Tenn. Workers' 
Comp. Panel Sept. 25, 2008) (holding the lower cap applied because the collective 
bargaining agreement required a five percent pay reduction during a layoff period due to a 
lengthy plant shutdown to retool its assembly lines for production of a new product). 
Although the pre-Reform cases do not control the outcome of the present case, the 
logic and reasoning behind the Tennessee Supreme Court's holdings are helpful in defining 
"wages" as used in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(3)(B) (2015). The pre-
Reform cases are also instructive regarding the effect of a collective bargaining agreement in 
relation to an employee's request for increased benefits. 
In Ms. Marshall's case, the parties stipulated the hourly pay of all employees within 
the affected departments changed due to the summer hours' bonus program. The summer 
hours' bonus program was, and continues to be, governed by a collective bargaining 
agreement that was in effect prior to Ms. Marshall's injury on August 14, 2014. The terms of 
the Memorandum Agreement plainly state the union accepted the summer bonus hours' 
program because the "business environment is in a recession." The parties stipulated the 
terms of the Memorandum Agreement entered into on May 7, 2013, are still ongoing, and 
Ms. Marshall's summer hours' bonus pay will resume in June 2016. 
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As with the employee in Wilkins, supra, a collective bargaining agreement governs 
Ms. Marshall's change in hourly rate. Despite the liberal construction in favor of employees 
for pre-Reform cases, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that Ms. Wilkins was not entitled to 
temporary partial disability benefits even though her pre-injury hourly wage was higher for 
twenty hours of overtime that she worked each week. In its analysis, the Court focused on 
Ms. Wilkins' "regular wage" and determined it remained the same before and after her 
injury. !d. at 153. It also focused on the fact that Ms. Wilkins' took home less pay after her 
injury because the loss of her twenty hours of overtime wages "was mandated by a union 
contract." !d. The collective bargaining agreement in Wilkins controlled the prohibition 
against an employee working overtime while on light duty, which was clearly a determinative 
factor in the Court's analysis. !d. Likewise, Ms. Marshall's "normal base rate of pay" is 
what she was making when the initial compensation period expired on October 13, 2015. 
Specifically, Ms. Marshall was making her "normal base rate of pay" on October 13,2015, 
because the collective bargaining agreement in effect prior to her injury on August 14, 2014, 
required it. 
Ms. Marshall's case is also analogous to an employee who works a swing shift and 
makes a shift differential increase depending on the particular shift worked. In Ms. 
Marshall's case, her injury occurred on August 14, 2014, during Mueller's summer hours' 
bonus program, which runs from approximately June 2 through October 4 each year. 
Therefore, her hourly pay at the time of her injury was $19.56 plus overtime. Once the initial 
compensation period expired on October 13,2015, her hourly pay had returned to her normal 
base rate of pay of$17.86. If Ms. Marshall's injury had occurred in any month of the year 
besides June through October, her hourly pay at the end of the initial compensation period 
would either be the same or higher resulting in no entitlement to increased benefits. 
The second sentence of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(3)(8) (2015) 
specifically states, "[i]f appropriate, the injured employee's award as determined under 
subdivision (3)(A) shall be increased by multiplying the award by a factor of one and thirty-
five one hundredths (1.35)." (Emphasis added.) The word "appropriate" means "right or 
suited for some purpose or situation.''7 The phrase "[i]f appropriate" indicates an employee 
is only entitled to increased benefits if the Court finds that the statute's preceding sentence is 
satisfied. 
In Ms. Marshall's case, ordering increased benefits would result in an illogical 
outcome dependent upon which months of the year Ms. Marshall happened to be injured and 
returned to work. The Court finds that the collective bargaining agreement required that Ms. 
Marshall return to her "normal base rate of pay" on October 13, 2015. Accordingly, under 
the facts of this case, this Court finds increased benefits are not appropriate, and respectfully 
declines to award increased permanent partial disability benefits. 
7 
www.merriam-webster.com (last visited March 9, 2016). 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the claim ofMs. Marshall against Mueller or its 
workers' compensation carrier for the requested increased permanent partial disability 
benefits is denied. 
ENTERED this the 9th day of March, 2016. 
Andre . Headrick 
Workers' Compensation Judge 
Right to Appeal: 
Tennessee Law allows any party who disagrees with this Compensation Hearing 
Order to appeal the decision to the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board. To file a 
Notice of Appeal, you must: 
1. Complete the enclosed form entitled: "Compensation Hearing Notice of Appeal." 
2. File the completed form with the Court Clerk within thirty calendar days ofthe date 
the Workers' Compensation Judge entered the Compensation Hearing Order. 
3. Serve a copy of the Compensation Hearing Notice of Appeal upon the opposing party. 
4. The appealing party is responsible for payment of a filing fee in the amount of$75.00. 
Within ten calendar days after the filing of a notice of appeal, payment must be 
received by check, money order, or credit card payment. Payments can be made in 
person at any Bureau office or by United States mail, hand-delivery, or other delivery 
service. In the alternative, the appealing party may file an Affidavit oflndigency, on 
a form prescribed by the Bureau, seeking a waiver of the filing fee. The Affidavit of 
Indigency may be filed contemporaneously with the Notice of Appeal or must be filed 
within ten calendar days thereafter. The Appeals Board will consider the Affidavit of 
Indigency and issue an Order granting or denying the request for a waiver of the filing 
fee as soon thereafter as is practicable. Failure to timely pay the filing fee or file the 
Affidavit of lndigency in accordance with this section shall result in dismissal of the 
appeal. 
5. The party filing the notice of appeal, having the responsibility of ensuring a complete 
record on appeal, may request from the Court Clerk the audio recording ofthe hearing 
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for the purpose of having a transcript prepared by a licensed court reporter and filing 
it with the Court Clerk within fifteen calendar days of the filing of the Compensation 
Hearing Notice of Appeal. Alternatively, the party filing the appeal may file a joint 
statement of the evidence within fifteen calendar days of the filing of the 
Compensation Hearing Notice of Appeal. The statement of the evidence must convey 
a complete and accurate account of what transpired in the Court of Workers' 
Compensation Claims and must be approved by the Workers' Compensation Judge 
before the record is submitted to the Clerk of the Appeals Board. See Tenn. Comp. R. 
& Regs. 0800-02-22-.03 (20 15). 
6. After the Workers' Compensation Judge approves the record and the Court Clerk 
transmits it to the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, the appeal will be 
docketed and assigned to an Appeals Board Judge for review. At that time, a 
docketing notice shall be sent to the parties. Thereafter, the party who filed the notice 
of appeal shall have fifteen calendar days after the issuance ofthe docketing notice to 
submit a briefto the Appeals Board for consideration. Any opposing party shall have 
fifteen calendar days after the filing of the appellant's brief to file a brief in response. 
No reply briefs shall be filed. Briefs shall comply with the Practice and Procedure 
Guidelines of the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board. See Tenn. Comp. R. & 
Regs. 0800-02-22-.03(6) (2015). 
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APPENDIX 
Technical record: 
1. Petition for Benefit Determination, filed November 10, 2015; 
2. Dispute Certification Notice, filed December 14, 2015; 
3. Request for Initial Hearing, filed December 15, 2015; 
4. Transfer Order, entered December 21, 2015; 
5. Initial Hearing Order, entered January 19, 2016; 
6. Mueller Company's Pre-Hearing Statement, filed February 4, 2016; 
7. Tara Marshall's Pre-Hearing Statement, filed February 2, 2016; 
8. Mueller Company's Exhibit List, filed February 5, 2016; and, 
9. Mueller Company's Witness List, filed February 5, 2016. 
The Court did not consider attachments to Technical Record filings unless admitted into 
evidence during the Compensation Hearing. The Court considered factual statements in 
these filings or any attachments to them as allegations unless established by the evidence. 
Exhibits: 
1. Workers' Compensation Settlement Agreement dated July 31, 20 15; 
2. Medical report and impairment rating from Dr. Ben Miller, dated March 3, 2015, 
and March 5, 2015; 
3. Collective bargaining agreement entitled "Memorandum Agreement," dated May 
7, 2013; and, 
4. Joint Stipulation of the Parties, filed February 2, 2016. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the Compensation Hearing Order 
was sent to the following recipients by the following methods of service on this the 9th 
day ofMarch, 2016 
Name Certified First Via 
Mail Class Fax 
Mail 
Jeffrey W. 
Rufolo 
Joseph R. 
White 
Fax Via Email Address 
Number Email 
X jrufolo@summersfirm. 
com 
X jrw@smrw .com 
PENNY SHRUM, COURT CLERK 
wc.courtclerk@tn. gov 
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